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THE INTERPRETATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY,
OR CHARLES BEARD BECOMES A
FORTUNETELLER (WITH AN
EMPHASIS ON FREE EXPRESSION)
Stephen M. Feldman*
In An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States, published in 1913, Charles A. Beard argued that the
framers and contemporaneous supporters of ratification advocated for and defended the Constitution because of their eco1
nomic interests. “The point is,” he wrote, “that the direct, impelling motive . . . was the economic advantages which the
beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first, from
2
their action.” The bulk of the book focused on the framers, with
Beard marshaling empirical evidence that ostensibly detailed
3
their personal property holdings. From this evidence, Beard
claimed to show that the framers represented “distinct groups
whose economic interests they understood and felt in concrete,
definite form through their own personal experience with identi4
cal property rights.”
Beard acknowledged that numerous framers had proclaimed
they were motivated by a virtuous desire to promote the “general
welfare” or the “public good”—or as it is frequently called, the
5
common good. Yet, Beard dismissed the notion of the common
6
good as a “vague thing.” He explained that invocation of “the
* Housel/Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1986 Free Press ed.; 1st ed. 1913).
2. Id. at 17–18.
3. Id. at 73–151.
4. Id. at 73. As others have noted, Beard did not precisely define the concept of an
economic interpretation. Sometimes, he seemed to associate it with a “profit motive,” and
other times, he seemed to associate it with a general (economic) class interest. Forrest
McDonald, A New Introduction, in BEARD, supra note 1, at vii, xiii–iv (1986 ed.).
5. E.g., BEARD, supra note 1, at 17, 157, 199, 202, 204.
6. Id. at 17.
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general good is a passive force, and unless we know who are the
7
several individuals that benefit in its name, it has no meaning.”
In other words, pursuit of the common good was not so much a
8
motive as a veneer, which obscured economic interests.
A century after the publication of An Economic Interpretation, one can fairly conclude both that the book was “seminal” and
9
that subsequent scholarship has “undermined Beard’s thesis.”
When An Economic Interpretation first appeared, most reviewers
10
greeted it with hostility. Over the next decades, though, it became increasingly influential until, by the 1940s, it had become the
11
“prevailing orthodoxy.” In the 1950s, Beard’s fortune swung
12
again: Critics and defenders engaged in a well-publicized battle.
Many of Beard’s critics, though, continued to follow an economic
approach to the framing, even as they disagreed with the details
13
of Beard’s argument. The nature of framing historiography,
however, started to change dramatically in the late 1960s. Several
historians argued persuasively that one could better understand
the framing (and the Revolution) by focusing on political ideology
14
rather than economic interests. As this more ideological approach became ascendant, one of its most prominent practitioners, Gordon Wood, unceremoniously pronounced Beard’s thesis
15
to be “undeniably dead.” And in fact, while several historians
have chipped away at the edifice of the ideological approach, with
16
its emphasis on civic republicanism, it still dominates the skyline
17
of historical scholarship on the framing.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 155.
See, e.g., id. at 73 (emphasizing “economic motives”).
McDonald, supra note 4, at ix.
Id. at xviii–xx. Such hostility, however, was not universal. Id.
Id. at xxii.
For summaries of both sides of the battle, see ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987); McDonald, supra note 4, at xxvi–xxxii.
13. E.g., Forrest McDonald, The Beard Thesis Attacked, II: A Political-Economic
Approach, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at
113 (arguing that Beard’s focus on personal property was too simplistic).
14. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON
S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969); see FORREST
MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985) (attempting to integrate multiple approaches).
15. WOOD, supra note 14, at 626.
16. Forum: The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (A Symposium of
Views and Reviews), 44 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1987). Forrest McDonald, when discussing
civic republicanism, acknowledged that Wood has done “the most nearly exhaustive
study,” but then added, “I disagree in many ways with Wood’s analysis.” MCDONALD,
supra note 14, at 67 n.25.
17. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (assessing the historical scholarship at that point in time).
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Thus, the current historical consensus is that Beard’s thrust—
his focus on the framers as creating a capitalist order primarily to
protect their own interests—is incorrect. In this essay, I largely
agree with this critical assessment of Beard’s historical approach,
though with qualifications. One might say that Wood exaggerated
Beard’s demise: A consideration of economic interests can help
illuminate the ideology of the founding. To be sure, Beard missed
most of the story of the founding, but his economic approach can
still add an important element to the discussion. Plus, as I explain,
despite Beard’s historical errors, he has become a prescient fortuneteller. His economic depiction of the Constitution does not
closely fit the framing, but it uncannily fits the Roberts Court’s
current interpretation of our constitutional order. Beard might
have gotten the history wrong, but he got the future right.
Part I summarizes an ideological approach while also explaining how a consideration of economic interests illuminates the
founding. It emphasizes how the framers conceived of citizenship
and government in republican democratic terms, even though
they were strongly concerned with the protection of individual
18
rights, especially property rights. Ultimately, the framers sought
balance between government power and economic interests: They
sought to enhance the protection of property rights, but they simultaneously empowered government to act for the common good,
even at the expense of property. Part I concludes with a discussion
of free expression under republican democracy and an assessment
of Beard’s interpretation of the framing. Part II describes how social and cultural forces led to the collapse of republican democracy and the rise of pluralist democracy in the early twentieth century. This transition, as explained, changed the conception of free
expression. The Part concludes by examining how pluralist democracy continued to evolve after World War II. Part III focuses
on the Roberts Court and its landmark First Amendment deci19
sion, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. This Part
underscores the overlap between Beard’s thesis and the Roberts
Court’s interpretation of the framing and the Constitution. Part
IV, the Conclusion, suggests how politics might have influenced
both Beard’s and the Roberts Court’s interpretations of constitutional history.
18. My definition of republican democracy, as will become clear, overlaps but is not
identical with a technical definition of civic republicanism. See RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 9–12 (1992) (discussing definitional problems
related to civic republicanism).
19. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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I. THE FOUNDERS AND REPUBLICAN DEMOCRACY
From the founding until the early twentieth century, the na20
tion operated as a republican democratic regime. Under republican democracy, citizens and elected officials were supposed to
be virtuous: in the political realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own “private and
21
partial interests.” When citizens or officials used governmental
institutions to pursue their own interests, then the government
was corrupt. Groups of like-minded citizens who corrupted the
government were deemed factions, whether constituted by a majority or a minority of citizens. In Federalist Number 10, James
Madison described a faction as “a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma22
nent and aggregate interests of the community.” By definition,
then, a factionally controlled government pursues “partial inter23
24
ests” or “private passions” rather than the common good.
Founding-era Americans believed they were especially wellsuited for this form of government. An agrarian economy where
many white Protestant men were freeholders engendered a rough
material equality, unknown elsewhere in the world, and this ma25
terial equality in turn engendered a culture of political equality.
“I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1787, “as long as they are chiefly
agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant lands
26
in any part of America.” Sixteen years later, St. George Tucker
echoed Jefferson: “[S]cenes of violence, tumult, and commotion,”
which had destroyed earlier republics, Tucker explained, “can

20. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 14–45, 153–208 (2008).
21. WOOD, supra note 14, at 59; e.g., Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), reprinted in THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1908, 1908 (Ben Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) (emphasizing government for “the common benefit”).
22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (note: all citations to the Federalist
are to the Project Gutenberg eText of The Federalist Papers); see James Madison, In Virginia Convention, June 5, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC
WRITINGS 46, 46 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) (arguing that majority factions have produced
unjust laws) [hereinafter COMPLETE].
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
25. See WOOD, supra note 14, at 100 (quoting Josiah Quincy).
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 2
GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 112, 115 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1958).
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never be apprehended [in America], whilst we remain, as at present, an agricultural people, dispersed over an immense terri27
tory.” Moreover, with an overwhelming number of Americans
being committed to Protestantism and tracing their ancestral
roots to Western or Northern Europe, the people seemed sufficiently homogeneous to join together in the pursuit of the com28
mon good.
Two aspects of republican democratic government, as understood by the founders, are worth underscoring. First, although not
all Americans were white Protestant Anglo-Saxons, political exclusion preserved at least a surface homogeneity. According to republican democratic theory, non-virtuous individuals (or non-virtuous societal groups) would be unwilling to forgo the pursuit of
their own private interests. Instead, they would form factions bent
29
on corruption. Significantly, then, an alleged lack of civic virtue
could supposedly justify the forced exclusion of a group from the
polity. On this pretext, African Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, women, and other peripheral groups were precluded from
participating in republican democracy for much of American his30
tory. Thus, although the concepts of virtue and the common
good typically remained nebulous in the abstract, they closely mirrored mainstream white Protestant male values and interests in
concrete political (and judicial) contexts.
Second, the framers believed that the state governments of
the 1780s provided valuable experiences in the drafting of constitutions. Most important, the state constitutions had been too optimistic: They had conceptualized American citizens as predominantly virtuous. Virtue alone supposedly would sustain the
republican state governments. Experience had deflated that optimism. That was the lesson of Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts,
where indebted landowners sought governmental refuge for
money owed. John Jay wrote to George Washington: “Private
rage for property suppresses public considerations, and personal
27. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 31 (1803).
28. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE
DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 161–68 (1997); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay) (emphasizing
the homogeneity of the American people).
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
30. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 23–26, 38–40, 293–94. Of course, other forces—and
pretexts—also contributed to the exclusion of peripheral groups.
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rather than national interests have become the great objects of
attention. Representative bodies will ever be faithful copies of
their originals, and generally exhibit a checkered assemblage of
31
virtue and vice, of abilities and weakness.” All too often, it
seemed, factional groups used the institutions of government to
32
satisfy their own interests.
Consequently, the framers believed that, in constructing a republican government, they needed to devote greater attention to
33
protecting individual rights, especially property rights. Before
the Revolution, Americans understood the need to protect individual rights from the British monarchy. With the repudiation of
the monarchy, however, the protection of rights from the government seemed less urgent. After all, in the American (state) republics, the people were the source of government, and the government represented the people. Could the people threaten their
own rights? Surprisingly, the experiences of the 1780s had answered that question affirmatively. Thus, now, Publius unequivocally declared that Lockean rights to liberty and property must be
34
strongly protected. Even though liberty and property caused factionalism—Madison metaphorically explained that “[l]iberty is to
faction what air is to fire”—protecting such individual rights
35
should be, said Madison, “the first object of government.”
Even so, the framers refused to sacrifice their civic republican
principles. “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to
be,” Madison declared, “first to obtain for rulers men who possess
most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common
good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to
36
hold their public trust.” How, then, could a constitution respect

31. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (June 27, 1786), reprinted in 2
GREAT ISSUES, supra note 26, at 80-81; see WOOD, supra note 14, at 410–13 (discussing
Shays’ Rebellion).
32. See, e.g., James Wilson, In the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138, 141–42, app. A (Max Farrand
ed., 1966 reprint of 1937 rev. ed.) [hereinafter Farrand] (lamenting licentiousness of citizens and governmental problems).
33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing republican
problems arising from human nature).
34. The very meaning of liberty shifted. Under civic republicanism, liberty primarily
concerned individual freedom to participate in government. Now, liberty also concerned
the pursuit of self-interest in the private sphere. WOOD, supra note 14, at 24, 609; see
MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 4, 9–55 (emphasizing ambiguity of terms such as liberty).
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
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individual rights while simultaneously maintaining civic republican principles? The framers answered this question by conceptually distinguishing two separate spheres: that of civil society or the
37
private sphere, and that of government or the public sphere. In
the private sphere, individuals were expected to act as self-interested commercial and economic strivers. If people enjoyed liberty, then they would revel in their passions and interests. The
strongest and most enduring interest was economic (property and
38
wealth). Moreover, the framers recognized that many if not most
citizens would be motivated to pursue their own passions and interests not only in the commercial or private world but also in the
public world. They understood that factions would inevitably
form and seek to control government.
But still, the framers insisted that virtue and reason could
overcome passion and interest in public affairs and that, therefore, government could be conducted in accord with civic repub39
lican ideals. The framers believed in the existence of a virtuous
elite—including themselves—who would pursue the common
good in the public sphere even while pursuing their own interests
in the private sphere. In a properly structured constitutional system, the people would at least sometimes elect the virtuous elite
to public offices. And in the event that an insufficiently virtuous
individual were elected, the system would be structured to control
40
the “effects” of self-interest and factionalism. Mechanisms such
as federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, and checks and
balances dispersed power among a multitude of governmental institutions, departments, and officials, each of which would have its
41
own interests. “[T]he constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a
42
sentinel over the public rights.” In other words, the Constitution
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (distinguishing between
“public and private faith” as well as “public and personal liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
14 (James Madison) (emphasizing government would be “in favor of private rights and
public happiness”).
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (emphasizing
the importance of property to the framers).
39. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 189–209; POCOCK, supra note 14, at 513–26;
WOOD, supra note 14, at 391–468. “In the civic humanist ethos, then, the individual knew
himself to be rational and virtuous.” POCOCK, supra note 14, at 466.
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
41. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Madison discussing the advantages of a bicameral legislature and an executive veto on legislative actions).
42. Id.
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dispersed power among so many institutions, departments, and
officials that the self-interested grasping of one would inevitably
be met by the self-interested grasping of another. Ultimately, the
framers intended the various structural mechanisms to promote
the virtuous pursuit of the common good in the public sphere and
simultaneously to protect individual rights and liberties in the pri43
vate sphere.
What, then, was the relationship between the government
and individual rights, as understood by the framers? On the one
hand, the framers feared that factions—especially factions constituted by the poor—would use governmental institutions to trample individual rights, particularly property rights. Thus, the various checks and mechanisms in the constitutional system were
needed to temper the democratic potential of the government. On
the other hand, and perhaps most important, the framers believed
the government could diminish or infringe on individual rights
and liberties if the government acted in pursuit of the common
44
good (and otherwise acted consistently with the Constitution).
In this sense, the public took priority over the private. James Wilson, for instance, stated: “[A]s I have said before, no government,
either single or confederated, can exist, unless private and individual rights are subservient to the public and general happiness
45
of the nation.” The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights explicitly manifested this view: “nor shall private property be taken
46
for public use, without just compensation.” In other words, the
Constitution protected private property, but even so, the government could still take private property for public use—that is, to
promote the common good—so long as the government paid just
47
compensation. From the framers’ perspective, the pursuit of the
43. “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (arguing that the new government would be “in favor of private rights and public happiness”). Rogers Smith writes:
“The founders of the United States did indeed define and construct their new nation in
accord with Enlightenment doctrines of individual liberties and republican self-governance more than any regime before and most since.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS
470–71 (1997).
44. Nedelsky argues that the framers created a system where ordinary people consent
to their governance without truly governing themselves. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 149.
45. James Wilson, supra note 32, at 141, appendix A; see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE
PEOPLE’S WELFARE 9–11 (1996) (emphasizing that the superiority of the public over the
private sphere continued at least through the nineteenth century).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
47. In a similar vein, Madison repeatedly argued that the government could assist a
particular business enterprise if doing so would further the common good. James Madison,
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common good simultaneously empowered and limited the government. The government could take almost any action—even
taking property—so long as it was for the common good, but simultaneously, the government could not do anything, unless it was
for the common good. In this way, the framers aimed to achieve a
balance between governmental power and the protection of prop48
erty and other rights. Or, from another perspective, the Constitution successfully curbed the democratic energies of the people
without disabling the government.
Of course, subsequent to the founding, individuals would
sometimes challenge the legality of governmental actions. During
the long-running republican democratic era, courts would frequently resolve such disputes by focusing on the distinction between, on the one hand, the common good and, on the other, partial or private interests, or as it was sometimes phrased, the
difference between reasonable and arbitrary action (arbitrary ac49
tion was sometimes categorized as class legislation). The key to
the judicial analysis was the categorization of the governmental
purpose: Was it for the common good or not? If the legislature
had acted for the common good, then the court would uphold the
government’s action. If the legislature had instead acted for the
benefit of private or partial interests, then the court would invalidate the government’s action. In the early decades of nationhood,
courts would frequently emphasize that the government could not
indiscriminately take property from one citizen and give it to another. In typical language, Chief Justice Stephen Hosmer of Connecticut stated, “If . . . the legislature should enact a law, without
any assignable reason, taking from A. his estate, and giving it to
B., the injustice would be flagrant, and the act would produce a

In First Congress (Apr. 9, 1789), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 276; James Madison, In First Congress (1789), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 272; James Madison, Letter to Clarkson Crolius (Dec. 1819), reprinted in COMPLETE, supra note 22, at 270;
James Madison, Letter to D. Lynch, Jr. (June 27, 1817), reprinted in Complete, supra note
22, at 271.
48. “Madison’s political thought was characterized by an often agonized effort to find
a working balance between the rights of property and republican principles.” NEDELSKY,
supra note 38, at 12.
49. E.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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sensation of universal insecurity.” 50 Even so, in the words of Chancellor James Kent, “private interest must be made subservient to
51
the general interest of the community.”
During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, jurists conceptualized free expression similarly to other individual rights. Lower courts and eventually the U.S. Supreme
Court consistently allowed the government to punish speech or
writing that supposedly engendered bad tendencies because such
expression undermined virtue and contravened the common
52
good. For example, in a case upholding a conviction under a state
flag desecration statute, the Court reasoned, “It is familiar law
that even the privileges of citizenship and the rights inhering in
personal liberty are subject, in their enjoyment, to such reasona53
ble restraints as may be required for the general good.” Consequently, because the flag was an important “symbol of [the] country’s power and prestige,” a statute prohibiting the display of the
flag in advertisements did not violate “any right of personal lib54
erty.” Similarly, in several World War I Espionage Act cases, the
Court upheld convictions of defendants for protesting against the
draft and the war. In Debs v. United States, the Court explicitly
approved jury instructions that tracked the bad tendency doctrine: “[T]he jury were most carefully instructed that they could
not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his opinions
unless the words used had as their natural tendency and reasona55
bly probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service, &c.”
At this point, an assessment of Charles Beard’s interpretation of the framing is in order. Beard maintained that an economic
interpretation best explained the Constitution and its framing.
The Constitution, he concluded, “was an economic document
drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly
50. Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822). For additional examples, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,
28 F.Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2
Yer.) 599 (1831); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
51. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1827; Legal Classics
Library Reprint).
52. E.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276–77 (1915); Patterson v. Colorado ex
rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 106 N.E.
556 (Mass. 1914); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811).
53. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 42 (1907).
54. Id.
55. 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). As was commonly done, the Court also stated that the
government must prove that the defendant had specific intent, but this requirement could
be satisfied by constructive intent (which followed from proof of bad tendencies). Id.
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to identical interests in the country at large.” 56 To put it crassly, a
wealthy minority designed the Constitution to protect the interests of the wealthy. In the words of Leonard Levy, Beard construed “the Constitution as a conservative economic document
framed by an unrepresentative minority employing undemocratic
means to protect personal property interests by establishing a central government responsive to their needs and able to thwart pop57
ulistic majorities in the states.” Beard, in other words, interpreted the Constitution and the framing as if all the citizens,
including the framers—especially the framers—were homines
58
economici (that is, economic selves or rational self-maximizers).
For Beard, the private subsumed the public: The Constitution
metamorphosed into a private sphere document. As Beard
phrased it, the Constitution sprang “essentially out of conflicts of
59
economic interests.”
Beard was, at best, partly right and partly wrong—but nonetheless significantly wrong. The framers unquestionably wanted
to protect economic interests, and they undoubtedly were aware
of their own interests. Yet, contrary to Beard’s assertions, the
framers also genuinely believed in the virtuous pursuit of the com60
mon good. They were not wielding republican democratic principles merely as a pretext. Thus, the framers memorialized the
governmental goal of the common good in the Preamble of the
Constitution: “We the People” aimed to “promote the General
61
Welfare.” Ultimately, the constitutional system was based on
balance: balance between governmental power and the protection

56.
57.

BEARD, supra note 1, at 188.
Leonard Levy, Introduction—The Making of the Constitution, 1776-1789, in
ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION ix, xxxi–xxxii (2d ed. 1987). Levy colorfully added, “The Economic Interpretation is written in the same spirit that would describe
the performances of a great violin virtuoso as the scraping of horse hair on dried cats’ guts.”
Id. at xxxi.
58. “The neoclassical economists’ Homo Economicus has several characteristics, the
most important of which are (1) maximizing (optimizing) behavior; (2) the cognitive ability
to exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic behavior and independent tastes and
preferences.” Chris Doucouliagos, A Note on the Evolution of Homo Economicus, 28 J.
ECON. ISSUES, 877, 877–878 (1994); see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (discussing and criticizing concept of
homo economicus); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on
the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973 (2000)
(same).
59. Charles A. BEARD, Introduction to the 1935 Edition, reprinted in Beard, supra
note 1, at xli, xliii.
60. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison).
61. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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of property and other rights. From the framers’ perspective, citi62
zens were partly good and partly bad. Men were not “angels,”
63
but neither were they beasts. This was no less true of the framers
themselves than of other citizens. Experience unfortunately had
shown that, in republican government, passion and interest fre64
quently overpower reason. Nonetheless—and this point is crucial—Publius unequivocally believed not only that a virtuous elite
existed but also that the American people as a whole possessed
sufficient virtue to sustain republican government. The framers
neither repudiated republican democracy nor accepted factional
and self-interested government as inevitable. The framers’ concerted effort to construct a republican government at the national
level, Publius recognized, “presupposes the existence” of men’s
65
virtue. Without such virtue, “nothing less than the chains of des66
potism” would be possible.
II. THE TRANSITION TO PLURALIST DEMOCRACY:
FREE EXPRESSION BECOMES A CONSTITUTIONAL
LODESTAR
Grounded on the rural, agrarian, and relatively homogeneous American society of the nineteenth century, republican democracy persisted, but a variety of forces strained the regime in
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. 67 These forces,
including industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, eventually led, in the 1930s, to the rise of pluralist democracy and the
collapse of the republican democratic regime. Mainstream and
old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the republican democratic ideals of virtue and the common good, were now
to be balanced with the values of other Americans who constituted the demographically diverse population. No single set of
cultural values was authoritative. Ethical relativism took hold as
a political reality: All values, all interests—or at least a plurality
62. MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 127
(1987).
63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); see WHITE, supra note 62, at 97 (tying
to Hume).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison).
66. Id.; see MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 70–77 (arguing that Southerners and New
Englanders conceptualized virtue with different emphases). Madison viewed the statelevel experiments in republicanism in the 1780s to be partial successes. Those successes
could be attributed only to “the virtue and intelligence of the people of America.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
67. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 166–97 (discussing in greater detail the development
and effects of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration).
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of values and interests—mattered to Franklin Roosevelt and the
68
New Dealers. Democracy now revolved around the assertion of
interests and values by sundry individuals and groups. The pursuit
of self-interest no longer amounted to corruption; rather it defined the nature of (pluralist) democracy. Diverse voluntary organizations, interest groups, and lobbyists openly sought to press
69
their claims through the democratic process.
For much of the 1930s, conservative Supreme Court justices
resisted the transition to pluralist democracy and attempted to
70
continue enforcing republican democratic principles. This judicial resistance provoked Roosevelt’s court-packing proposal, a
blatant political gesture intended to compel the justices to accept
71
the New Deal and (implicitly) pluralist democracy. By the end
of the decade, though—the turning point is usually deemed to be
1937—the Court had accepted the transition and stopped attempting to uphold the republican democratic principles of virtue
72
and the common good. Around this same time, political theorists
began to explicate the new form of democracy. The foundation
for the incipient democratic theory was the scholarly embrace of
relativism. While totalitarian governments, such as those in Nazi
Germany and Stalinist Russia, claimed knowledge of objective
values and forcefully imposed those values and concomitant goals
on their peoples, democratic governments allowed their citizens
73
to express multitudes of values and goals. The key to democracy
lay not in the specification of supposedly objective goals, such as
the common good, but rather in the following of processes that
allowed all citizens to voice their particular values and interests
74
within a free and open democratic arena. After World War II,
numerous political theorists celebrated pluralist democracy as the
68. E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Speech (Sept. 23, 1932), reprinted in 3 GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 335, 341–42 (Richard Hofstadter ed.,
1982). Roosevelt was far more solicitous of African American interests than any previous
president, yet he often sacrificed black interests and values so as to keep white Southerners
aligned with the Democratic party. FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 327–28. Also, Roosevelt
eventually broke with and became antagonistic toward big business. Id. at 318–19, 324.
69. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL 254–57, 362–66 (1990) (discussing
the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active participants on the national political
stage). Lobbying became open, aggressive, and institutionalized. Id. at 362.
70. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 147–94 (1993).
71. 81 CONG. REC. 877 (1937).
72. JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010); see FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 349–59 (discussing the 1937 switch).
73. See John Dewey & James H. Tufts, Ethics (1932 ed.), reprinted in JOHN DEWEY,
7 THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 1, 359 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1985).
74. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939).
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best means for accommodating “our multigroup society.” 75 The
only way to determine public values and goals, they explained, is
76
“through the free competition of interest groups.” By “compos77
ing or compromising” their different values and interests, the
“competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs
78
they can all support.” Legislative decisions therefore turned on
negotiation, persuasion, and the exertion of pressure through the
79
normal channels of the democratic process.
Many scholars and jurists emphasized that free expression
was a prerequisite to the pluralist democratic process. According
to this self-governance rationale for protecting free speech and
writing, free expression allows diverse groups and individuals to
contribute their views in the pluralist political arena. If governmental officials interfere with the pluralist process, if they dictate
or control public debates, then they skew the democratic outcomes and undermine the consent of the governed. In his book,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, Alexander Meiklejohn emphasized that the need to protect political expression
“springs from the necessities of the program of self-govern80
ment,” or in other words, from “the structure and functioning of
81
our political system as a whole.” Thus, pursuant to the self-governance rationale under pluralist democracy, free expression be82
came a constitutional “lodestar.” In a stark about-face from the
Court’s consistent repudiation of First Amendment claims during
the republican democratic era, the justices began to uphold one
83
free-speech claim after another. In the words of Robert A. Dahl,
75. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 9 (1949).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 10–11. Robert Dahl has presented, perhaps, the most comprehensive explanations of the democratic process. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS
(1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956).
80. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26 (1948).
81. Id. at 18.
82. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free
Speech In Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1996).
83. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is
protected free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating conviction for
distributing handbills); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (upholding right of unions to
organize in streets). “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

3 - FELDMANBEARD (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

7/18/2014 9:38 AM

337

“the democratic process does not exist” without free expression. 84
Even so, conservative scholars and justices, in particular, did not
always agree that free expression should receive special judicial
85
protection. They often reasoned, for example, that governmen86
tal interests outweighed First Amendment protections.
Since its emergence during the 1930s, pluralist democracy has
not remained static. While its basic principles, such as the opportunity to participate in the democratic process, have remained intact, its practice has evolved. For instance, from its outset, with its
emphasis on the individual pursuit of self-interest, pluralist democracy resonated with capitalist ideology. But during the postWorld War II era, the practice of democracy increasingly intertwined with the expanding mass-consumer culture. The Court recognized as much in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, which held unconstitutional a state
law that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising pre87
scription drug prices. Democracy involves the allocation of resources in society, the Court explained, but most resource-allocation decisions are made through the economic marketplace.
“Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is . . . dissemination of information as to who is producing
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price,” Jus88
tice Blackmun wrote for an eight-justice majority. Consequently,
advertising is essential for “the proper allocation of resources in a
89
free enterprise system.” In short, the American pluralist democ90
racy had become a consumers’ democracy. Not only was commerce and advertising central to democracy, but also politics had
grown increasingly like commercial consumption. Citizens followed their own values and interests, whether shopping for a

84. DEMOCRACY, supra note 79, at 170; see id. at 169–75 (discussing free speech and
other rights integral to the democratic process); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208 (emphasizing importance of free expression).
85. WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957).
86. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding that conviction of
American Communist leaders did not violate the First Amendment).
87. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
88. Id. at 765.
89. Id.
90. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC (2003); GARY CROSS, AN ALLCONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM WON IN MODERN AMERICA (2000);
Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV.
697 (1993).
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product or a candidate. 91 Election campaigns became “indistinguishable in form (and often in content) from product marketing
92
campaigns.”
The consumers’ democracy continued to evolve as corporations grew in size, wealth, and power. By the close of the twentieth
century, multinational corporations dominated the mass-con93
sumer culture as never before. Individuals rarely bought their
mass-produced items at independent Mom-and-Pop stores. Instead, people shopped at Target, or a Walmart Supercenter, or
online at Amazon.com. The American economy had thoroughly
94
transformed into a corporate capitalist system. Consequently,
pluralist democracy also was transformed as corporations more
resolutely used their bureaucratic organizations and accumulated
95
wealth to intervene in the pluralist democratic marketplace. In
other words, while democratic politics had previously become
more market-oriented, now corporate capitalism became more
overtly political. The consumers’ democracy had become Democ96
racy, Inc. With ever increasing proficiency, corporations manipulate elections and government for their own advantage—benefiting the respective corporations as well as corporate business in
97
toto. Citizens still vote, but corporations strongly influence
“highly managed elections” and shape governmental policy be98
tween elections. Corporate and governmental power coexist incestuously, with officials going back and forth between corporate
99
and governmental positions. Thus, the system readily self-prop-

91. “[S]elf-interested citizens increasingly view government policies like other market transactions, judging them by how well served they feel personally.” COHEN, supra
note 90, at 9.
92. Collins & Skover, supra note 90, at 725.
93. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 173–75 (2003).
94. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 23–151 (1992 ed.) (describing
McWorld); KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY 229–32, 284–86 (2002) (explaining the process of corporate transnationalization); cf., ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE
FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT (2008) (describing how corporations used the First Amendment to their advantage).
95. KERR, supra note 94, at 7–8.
96. Democracy Incorporated is the title of a book by Sheldon S. Wolin, SHELDON S.
WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED (2008), while Democracy, Inc. is the title of a book
by David S. Allen. DAVID S. ALLEN, DEMOCRACY, INC. (2005).
97. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 118–19
(2010).
98. WOLIN, supra note 96, at 149.
99. Id. at 63, 135–36 (describing “dual system of state and corporation”); see PETER
SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT xvii–xix (2011) (showing that congressional members reap financial benefits).
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agates: Corporate wealth skews electoral outcomes and governmental policies, while governmental officials and policies further
contribute to wealth inequality, in general, and corporate power,
100
more specifically.
III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND DEMOCRACY, INC.
The Roberts Court is the most pro-business Supreme Court
101
of the post-World War II era. Five of the current justices rank
among the top ten justices most favorable to business from the
102
1946 through the 2011 terms. Justice Alito and Chief Justice
103
Roberts are first and second on the list. In fact, the Roberts
Court interprets the Constitution as if Charles Beard had been
correct: The Constitution is an economic document designed to
protect the interests of the wealthy (the framers and their cohort).
The Court has demonstrated its pro-business inclination in a mul104
titude of cases. Perhaps, the most important series of such cases
involves campaign finance and free expression, given that campaign finance issues focus on the intersection between democratic
politics and wealth. Partly because of the evolution of pluralist democracy into, first, a consumers’ democracy, and next, Democracy, Inc., the conservative justices have become far more receptive to free-expression claims, particularly when free expression
intertwines with the economic marketplace.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the conservative bloc of five justices invalidated provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) that imposed limits
on corporate (and union) spending for political campaign adver105
tisements. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion began by articulating two First Amendment premises. First, the Court reiterated
100. For example, besides the obvious influence of governmental tax policies on
wealth distribution, governmental policies regarding unions, executive pay, and financial
markets have contributed to increasing wealth inequality. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note
97, at 47–70; see PHILLIPS, supra note 94, at 201–48 (explaining how governmental policies
affected wealth accumulation throughout American history).
101. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1431 (2013); see MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE
ROBERTS COURT (2013) (noting that some conservatives insist that Roberts Court is not
pro-business but concluding that, overall, it is).
102. Epstein et al., supra note 101, at 1472–73.
103. Id. at 1449–51.
104. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (limiting
human rights suits against corporations); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (restricting class actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
105. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Pub. L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81; see Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 319–22 (discussing statutory restrictions).
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the maxim, initially stated in Buckley v. Valeo, 106 that spending on
107
political campaigns constitutes speech. Second, the Court emphasized that, as stated in First National Bank of Boston v. Bel108
109
lotti, free-speech protections extend to corporations. With
those premises in hand, the Court moved to the crux of its reasoning, that free expression must be a constitutional lodestar in
American democracy. “Speech is an essential mechanism of de110
mocracy,” Kennedy wrote. “The right of citizens to inquire, to
hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means
111
to protect it.” From the Court’s perspective, then, corporate expenditures on political campaigns go the core of the First Amendment. Restrictions on such political speech and writing destroy
112
“liberty” and are necessarily unconstitutional, unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny by showing that the regulation
113
is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.
Could the government satisfy strict scrutiny? The prevention
of governmental corruption constitutes a compelling purpose, and
empirical evidence shows that excessive wealth corrupts the dem114
ocratic process in multiple ways. Excessive wealth can influence
not only who is elected to office but also which constituents are
115
served by government. Elected officials are far more likely to
respond to wealthy campaign contributors and to ignore the
116
poor. Yet, the Citizens United Court defined the concept of cor117
ruption so narrowly that this evidence was rendered irrelevant.
106. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
107. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–41.
108. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–42.
110. Id. at 339.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 354 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 130 (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961) (James Madison)).
113. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
114. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (discussing congressional findings of corruption); Brief of Amici Curiae Hachette Book Group, Inc. and
HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C. in Support of Neither Party on Supplemental Questions,
13–14, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205)
(same).
115. Larry M. Bartels et al., Inequality and American Governance, in INEQUALITY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 88, 115 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005);
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 684 (2010).
116. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 2–3, 285–86 (2008).
117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–62; see Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 118–21 (2010) (arguing that the Citizens United Court overly
narrowed the concept of corruption); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance
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According to Kennedy’s opinion, only a direct contribution to a
candidate or officeholder can constitute corruption or its appear118
ance. An independent expenditure, even on behalf of a specific
119
candidate or officeholder, cannot do so. Anything short of a
120
bribe or the appearance of a bribe is permissible. The government, it seems, cannot justify any regulation of expenditures,
121
whether by corporations or others. Ultimately, then, the Citizens United majority concluded that the government could not
satisfy strict scrutiny and that the BCRA restrictions on expendi122
tures were therefore unconstitutional.
The message of Citizens United is that money—no matter the
quantity—cannot corrupt democracy, except in extraordinarily
limited circumstances. The Court, in effect, proclaimed that corporations and other wealthy individuals and entities can spend unlimited sums in their efforts to determine elections and governmental policies. In the democratic sphere, wealth and corporate
power are now unfettered. Money can be expended indiscriminately on politics, and governmental regulations of spending are
constitutionally suspect. “The censorship we now confront is vast
123
in its reach,” the Court stated about the BCRA. “The Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most signif124
icant segments of the economy.’” From this perspective, speech
does not emanate from people, from citizens, but from “segments
125
of the economy.” The private economic sphere has subsumed
126
the public sphere.
What, ultimately, justified this conclusion in Citizens United?
Unsurprisingly, the conservative majority in Citizens United, like

Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (arguing that the Citizens United Court’s narrowing of the
definition of corruption was the most important part of the case).
118. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–57.
119. Id. at 357–59.
120. See id. at 356–60.
121. Kang, supra note 117, at 25–26.
122. 558 U.S. at 356–61.
123. Id. at 354.
124. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part)) (emphasis
added).
125. Id.
126. The Court underscored its determination to protect the private sphere and economic action in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., which extended the First Amendment to protect
marketplace activities that were only tenuously connected to expression. 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011). Sorrell invalidated a state statute that prevented pharmacies from selling information about prescriptions.
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in other cases, claimed to follow an originalist method of interpre127
tation. “There is simply no support for the view that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations,” the Court
128
stated. Indeed, the Court could have cited Charles Beard’s Economic Interpretation to bolster this interpretation of the framing
and the Constitution. Like Beard, the Court transformed the Constitution into a private-sphere document. Viewing this connection
from the opposite side, Beard comes into focus as a prescient fortuneteller. While he incorrectly interpreted the history of the
framing, he predicted the future with amazing foresight. His economic interpretation of the Constitution became the Roberts
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, Beard was
aware that a conservative Supreme Court could rely on his book
to support an economic interpretation of the Constitution—an
economic interpretation that could thwart the Progressive legisla129
tion that Beard would have supported politically. After all, one
could reasonably argue that if “the intention of the Framers was
to establish a capitalistic order, then any legislation aimed at re130
stricting the excesses of capitalism was unconstitutional.”
Beard’s awareness of this potential conservative reliance on his
work provided the first inkling of his preternatural clairvoyance:
A Supreme Court justice, in fact, first cited An Economic Interpretation for this conservative (and originalist) proposition in
1934. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell held that
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law did not violate the
131
contract clause. Justice Sutherland, dissenting, argued the framers had drafted the contract clause to preclude states from enacting statutes that interfered with contracts of credit and debt (like
132
the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law). In support of this

127. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (interpreting Second
Amendment supposedly pursuant to originalist methods). The Citizens United conservatives, it should be noted, devoted less space to originalism than has been given to it in some
other cases. TUSHNET, supra note 101, at 279–80.
128. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353. In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s originalist argument. “This is not only because the Framers and their contemporaries
conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it, but also because they held
very different views about the nature of the First Amendment right and the role of corporations in society.” Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Stevens added,
“The Framers thus took it as a given that corporations could be comprehensively regulated
in the service of the public welfare.” Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See McDonald, supra note 4, at xv.
130. Id.
131. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
132. Id. at 458–60.

3 - FELDMANBEARD (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

7/18/2014 9:38 AM

343

argument, Sutherland quoted a lengthy passage from An Eco133
nomic Interpretation.
The Roberts Court conservatives have pushed the Citizens
United holding and the Beardsian First Amendment interpretation in subsequent campaign finance cases. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the State of Arizona created a legislative “matching funds scheme” for campaign
134
financing. Under this scheme, a candidate for state office who
accepted public financing would receive additional funds if a privately financed opponent spent more than the publicly financed
candidate’s initial allocation. Thus, publicly and privately financed candidates would be able to spend roughly the same
amounts on their respective campaigns. In a five-to-four decision,
the conservative majority held this campaign finance scheme unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the flexible public financing system imposed a “penalty” by diminishing the privately fi135
In dissent, Justice Kagan
nanced candidate’s expression.
suggested that the majority’s reasoning was exactly backwards:
The public financing, she explained, “subsidizes and so produces
136
more political speech.” But the conservative majority was adamant: Any regulation of campaign financing constituted an unconstitutional burden on free speech. “[E]ven if the matching
funds provision did result in more speech by publicly financed
candidates and more speech in general, it would do so at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the speech
of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure
137
groups.” In effect, then, an individual’s wealth translates into
political power, and the government cannot diminish that
power—for instance, by providing equal funding to the less
wealthy.
In a second case, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock, a Montana statute provided that a “corporation may not
133. Id. at 458 n.3 (quoting BEARD, supra note 1, at 31–32). After Blaisdell, justices
have cited Beard’s Economic Interpretation only twice more, both again in dissents. Bell v.
State of Md., a civil rights case, upheld a conviction of African American sit-in protesters.
378 U.S. 226 (1964). Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the Court was following a
Beardsian approach by exalting “property in suppression of individual rights.” Id. at 253
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing BEARD, supra note 1, at 188). In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, Justice Powell cited Beard for the uncontroversial proposition that the framers drafted the
commerce clause partly because “trade and commercial problems” had arisen among the
states. 447 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
135. Id. at 2818.
136. Id. at 2833 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 2821.
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make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a politi138
cal party.” The Montana Supreme Court upheld this statute in
the face of a First Amendment challenge based on Citizens
United. The Montana Court reasoned that the specific history in
the state—of corporate corruption of democracy—supported the
state’s claim that the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve
139
a compelling purpose. In yet another five-to-four decision, the
conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In a
per curiam opinion reversing the Montana Court, the justices reasoned that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that Citizens United
controlled and precluded the state from even attempting to satisfy
140
the strict scrutiny test.
IV. CONCLUSION
Charles Beard interpreted the history of the framing so that
the Constitution appeared to be, above all else, an economic document sheltering individuals as they pursued their self-interest,
whether in the private or public sphere. On this crucial point,
Beard was wrong. True, Madison and other framers believed that
many citizens would follow their passions and interests while ignoring reason and virtue. But the main thrust of Federalist, Number 10, was that, despite this propensity in the citizenship, the nation should not succumb to passions, interests, and factional rule.
Instead, the framers insisted that, in the public sphere, reason and
virtue should control passion and interest. Passion and interest
might have free rein in the private sphere—but not in the public
sphere. The two spheres must remain separable—and usually,
government power should be in balance with individual rights—
but if anything, the public sometimes needs to predominate over
the private.
In Citizens United and other cases, the Roberts Court has interpreted the Constitution to echo the Beardsian approach. The
private sphere subsumes the public. Rational self-maximization,
apropos in the private sphere, becomes the governing rule of conduct in the public sphere. But contrary to the Roberts Court’s assertions, originalism cannot justify this economic interpretation of
the Constitution. If Beard is wrong historically—and he is—then
138. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-227(1) (2011)).
139. 132 S. Ct. at 2491; id. at 2491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing W. Tradition
P’ship v. Attorney Gen., 363 Mont. 220 (2011)).
140. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491.
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the Roberts Court is wrong, too. Yet, if original meaning (or framers’ intent) does not explain the economic interpretation, is there
an alternative explanation—if not justification? In his Introduction to the 1935 Edition of his book, Beard maintained that his
141
historical analysis was “coldly neutral” and “impartial.” Of
course, as part-and-parcel to its purported originalist method, the
Supreme Court conservatives likewise claim to pronounce neutral
142
and apolitical decisions. Why, then, do Beard and the Roberts
Court conservatives find the Constitution to be an economic document when other historians, such as Gordon Wood, perceive a
different Constitution?
Despite the claims to apolitical neutrality, politics helps explain Beard’s and the justices’ interpretations of constitutional
history and text, though the precise manner and degree to which
politics infuses their interpretive approaches are subject to debate. To be sure, Beard and the conservative Roberts Court justices stand on opposite ends of the political spectrum, yet their
political outlooks nonetheless overlap at a general level. Beard
was a Progressive historian who viewed societal changes as arising
143
from conflicts among vested interests. The Roberts Court conservatives, like many other conservatives of this era, believe that
self-interested marketplace transactions are more efficient than
and otherwise preferable to government-directed actions. Thus,
Beard and the conservative justices would agree (at a general
level) that self-interest politically motivates most, if not all, individuals. Several different theoretical approaches describe how
politics shapes Supreme Court decisionmaking. These same theoretical approaches suggest how both Beard and the Roberts Court
conservatives interpret the history of the framing so that the Constitution becomes, in their eyes, an economic document.
141. Beard, supra note 59, at xliv–vi.
142. E.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004)
(memorandum of Scalia, J.) (insisting that justices should not be political). Numerous
scholars claim that originalism is the only apolitical interpretive method. Indeed, they usually claim that any proposed alternatives ultimately leave the interpreter totally unconstrained. GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 395 (2010); Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two
Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009); Michael W.
McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388, 2415 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855, 862–63 (1989).
143. Progressives constantly emphasized that vested business interests were corrupting government. E.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 28–
29 (1904); see JOHN CHAMBERS, THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE 160 (2d ed. 1992); RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 215–17, 257 (1955); see also id. at 198–214 (discussing
Beard).
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For instance, some scholars, including many political scientists, would argue that Citizens United is a product of pure poli144
tics. The conservative justices outvoted their liberal colleagues
and, consequently, imposed their political preferences. Might the
same be true of Beard? Indeed, he did not need to outvote anybody. He merely needed to impose unilaterally his political vision
on the framing. Other scholars instead maintain that the Court
145
generally follows the political mainstream. From this perspective, Citizens United and its progeny seem predictable, if not inevitable, given that the Roberts Court operates within the parameters of Democracy, Inc. Similarly, one might argue, Beard
followed the Progressive mainstream with his economic interpretation. Yet, another theoretical approach maintains that, in most
cases, the justices sincerely interpret the Constitution but, because
interpretation is never mechanical, politics is necessarily an integral part of the process. In other words, the justices naturally vote
in accord with their politics even as they sincerely interpret the
146
constitutional text. In Citizens United, then, the conservative
justices sincerely interpreted the framing and the First Amendment in natural accordance with their political views. The same
would hold true for Beard.
In any event, one cannot reasonably explain either Citizens
United or Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
as products of originalism. The economic interpretation of the
Constitution does not correspond with either the original public
147
meaning or the framers’ intentions. The framers were serious
about protecting property rights, but simultaneously, they were
serious about empowering the government to act for the common
144. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
145. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 (2009). In political science,
this approach is called regimism. E.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010);
see Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into Mayonnaise, GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming) [hereinafter Feldman, Alchemy] (explaining
regimist approach).
146. See Feldman, Alchemy, supra note 145 (comparing institutional interpretivism to
other approaches); Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 89, 99–124 (2005) (introducing the approach).
147. I do not mean to suggest implicitly that originalism sometimes provides clear and
certain answers to constitutional issues. It does not. See Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming) (criticizing new originalism as being historically unjustified).
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good, even at the expense of private rights. The economic interpretation disregards the latter concern of the framers. The economic interpretation treats property rights as sacrosanct, but the
framers did not do so. The framers had a more sensible and balanced understanding of property. On the one hand, they understood that property must be protected and that property can motivate people to act in positive ways. On the other hand, they
understood that property was also a primary source of the greed
that could generate factions and corrupt government. The government must have ultimate control over property, and not vice
versa.
Yet, in a sense, one might nonetheless attribute partial responsibility to the framers for Citizens United and Beard’s book—
call it blame or praise, depending on one’s political outlook.
Wood and other historians explain that the American Revolution
and constitutional framing unleashed social and cultural forces
that would change America in ways beyond the anticipation of the
148
founding generation. True, the founders might have conceived
of the citizen in a particular manner—they might have aimed for
a balance between property rights and governmental power—but
forces beyond the founders’ control would ineluctably change the
nation, as it would become increasingly commercial and industrial. In other words, from this perspective, the founders might
have unwittingly created a society that would render their republican democratic principles of virtue and the common good anach149
ronisms in the twenty-first century. Of course, even if this historical view is correct, one does not have to accept the Roberts
Court’s economic Constitution as a foregone necessity anymore
than one has to accept Beard’s book as the best history.
Finally, I want to emphasize that I am not advocating for a
return to republican democracy as it was originally understood
and implemented. Such a return is neither desirable nor possi150
ble. Even if republican democratic government could be separated from the exclusionary practices that so often characterized
148. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789-1815, 1–4 (2009); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 3–8 (1991); see JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER
(1984) (arguing that Americans increasingly accepted liberal capitalism in 1790s).
149. See NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 1–14 (explaining that the Constitution ultimately gives too much protection to property despite Madison’s desire to achieve a balance).
150. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICS AND THE SUPREME
COURT: LAW, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY 85–92 (2013) (explaining how the early neoconservative goal of resurrecting republican democracy was doomed to fail).
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it—for instance, the denial of political rights to women and minorities—it was also tied to the agrarian, rural, and (partially) homogenous American society of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. That society no longer exists and cannot be resurrected.
Regardless, within the parameters of pluralist democracy, the
Court can uphold legislative controls on the intersection of wealth
and politics. The Court, without returning to republican democracy, can still seek to balance governmental power and property
rights, as the framers aimed to do. In short, the Court can refuse
to allow the private to subsume the public. Democratic politics
should not be at the whim of wealth.

